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BOOK REVIEWS
ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE, by Gerhard 0. W. Mueller
(Editor), Rothman & Company, 1961, 460 pages. Price: $10.00.
From four continents and twice as many countries, eighteen leading
authorities and scholars in the field of criminal law have contributed to a
worldwide search for new ideas. This quest-which has been crystallized in
Professor Mueller's new book, "Essays in Criminal Science"-has been
an eminently successful one. Indeed, this collection might well have been
entitled, "Ideas in Criminal Science," for its pages furnish stimulating and
challenging thoughts in this portion of the seamless web which constitutes
the law.
A brief venture into this collection of ideas presents significant questions
which arise from the contents of these essays. In Part One, which is expressly concerned with Contemporary Ideas, Professor Manuel Lopez-Rey
deals with the standardization of criminal processes and the use of modern
prediction tests. Is criminology becoming "more and more engulfed in the
technical-scientific current constituted by mass-education, mass-communication, mass-welfare, mass-persuasion, mass-leisure, mass-benefits, and massconformism"? If so, what factors may be contributing to such a threat? Is
the individual becoming a forgotten entry in an era of mass statistics and
treatment designed for time and money saving purposes? How scientifically
sound is it to use sampling groups for predicting the future behavior of individuals? Are these tests based too heavily upon underlying theories of
determination, and should a more sociological approach to criminology be
taken? What can be done to prevent the possible misuse of prediction scores
for quick decision making, or the use of such scores for other purposes than
those originally intended? What if they are used against non-conformists in
all senses, and what effect may they ultimately have on the dignity of man?
One may differ with some of the concepts advanced by the essay writer,
such as his criticism of the importance placed upon psychological factors in
the prediction of crime, and may feel that there are other remedies for the
problems he has pointed out which are more consistent with current criminological thought. Nevertheless, the questions raised by Lopez-Rey are of
considerable importance. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that he has provided some caution lights and guideposts for the future in this area.
From the modern age of prediction tests, one is moved to the distant
yesterday of pre-classical penology by Professor Paul Tappan's essay. However, he raises challenging questions for today. Does modern penal law bear
363
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the impressions of primitive custom and Germanic and ecclesiastical law?
If so, in what ways and to what extent? Does some contemporary thought
and theory bear the mark of ideas hundreds of years old?
Professor Hans von Hentig of the University of Bonn Law Faculty
explores the commonly mentioned theory that the criminal often returns to
the scene of the crime. Professor Franco Ferracuti of Italy deals with the
contribution of psychological testing to both criminal theory and diagnosis,
and the "dangerous dualism between psychology and sociology."
Professor Helen Silving of the University of Puerto Rico School of
Law, in her essay on "'Rule of Law' in Criminal Justice," raises thoughtprovoking questions of considerable importance. Has not a "virtual evolution" of criminal substantive law occurred in modern times with the shift
of penal philosophy and sentencing techniques from the "law of the act,"
which is concerned with the specific crime, to the "law of the actor," which
is more concerned with the personality of the individual? If so, is this adjustment being achieved "in a manner violative of the spirit of the constitution,
if not its letter"? What safeguards exist in the area of sentencing to protect
the individual from arbitrary decisions and deprivations of freedom? Does
the indeterminate sentence pose a threat to liberty? Is a return to theory
emphasizing the "retribution" aspect of punishment needed? What constitutional principles need re-examination in light of current social development
and what improvements can be made in criminal law machinery, especially
at the post-conviction stage, to effectuate and give these principles their full
meaning in terms of human rights? In this essay, as in all of the others, the
reader may differ with the author in some matters. Thus, one may feel that
a return to the retribution theory is unnecessary, and that concepts of liberty
and individual dignity may stand alone in meeting the danger presented by
shifting penological insight. Nevertheless, here, as in the other essays, one
must acknowledge the validity of many of the questions raised.
Following these essays on contemporary thought are ones dealing primarily
with general principles of criminal law. Here again is found the basic
theme which permeates the entire book and makes it a valuable contribution
to criminal science-a search for new ideas and thoughts. Professor Jerome
Hall begins this portion of the book by posing questions concerning the
logic, policy and factual aspects of criminal law. In the first of these areas,
he asks, what fundamental ideas or principles run throughout the criminal
law and give it organization and unity? Cannot one who knows the principles
ask the correct questions about each crime, even though he may be unfamiliar with its specific content? Is not the foundation of criminal law to
be found in seven basic principles: "(1) legality, (2) harm, (3) act (effort),
(4) mens rea, (5) the concurrence of the mens rea with the act to form the
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conduct, (6) causation, that is, a causal relationship between the conduct and
the harm, and (7) the punitive nature of the sanction"?
In the policy area, he poses the question whether criminal liability
should be extended to non-voluntary acts, and considers problems in the
area of regulatory crimes and objective liability founded upon the "reasonable
man" test. In the factual, or "law-in-action" aspect, Professor Hall poses
the challenging question whether there is a significant discrepancy between
the law "as expressed in books" and "the actual operation of the law" as it
affects the thinking and conduct of human beings.
Another essay in this area sets forth equally thought-provoking issues.
Professor Gerhard Mueller, in dealing with causation, raises serious question as to the adequacy of the state of the law. What has been the purpose
of Anglo-American law concerning causation, and is it fulfilling its purpose?
What are the various limitations which should be placed on any theory of
causation? Where there is more than one element contributing to a given
result, what criteria should be used to determine criminal liability? Is the
law, as currently applied by the courts, so vague that arbitrary and unjust
results often occur? Professor Mueller's excursion into comparative law
brings forth a number of ideas relating to the objective, objective-subjective,
and finalistic theories for one's consideration. In the final portion of his
essay, he raises questions as to which approach is best, poses his own solution
and tests it against concrete situations such as the "pre-Redline" Pennsylvania felony murder cases. One may disagree with Professor Mueller on
certain minor points, and indeed may question the validity of theories resting
upon a deterrent basis-that of "seeking to dissuade persons tempted to do
so from engaging in conduct which will bring about a certain legally recognized harm." It may well be argued that such considerations do not influence
the thought processes of most criminals. Underlying psychological factors
may be of more importance, and it may be that, in addition to a separate
mens rea requirement, any theory of causation should be based primarily on
these factors. Nevertheless, characteristic of the entire book, Professor
Mueller raises important questions and sets forth numerous ideas as food for
thought in his essay.
The next essay, that of Professor Johs. Andenaes, deals with the effects
of ignorance of the law. In such cases, what doctrines should be appliedabsolute liability, judicial discretion, fault or mens rea? Furthermore, what
effect should this ignorance have upon the verdict and punishment-full
acquittal, less than the usual minimum, a lesser form of criminal liability,
other mitigation or none?
Professor James Starrs, in his essay on the "Regulatory Offenses in
Historical Perspective," raises serious questions as to whether the regulatory
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statute has become a mischievous instrument which both threatens the liberties of innocent persons and carries with it grave practical consequences for
members of society as a whole. Have present trends in this area tended
to "distort and disparage the true nature of the regulatory offense and consequently efface the benign society conscience which inspired them"?
The last two portions of the book, dealing with "Problems of Forensic
Medicine" and "Law Reform Abroad," also present new ideas. The former
begins with an essay by Professor Norval Morris concerning defenses of
insanity. He asks whether new definitions, similar to those found in some
of the Australian code states, could not be used to replace the M'Naughten
Rule. Are these definitions more in accord with psychological and sociological realities? Professor J. Ll. J. Edwards then views possibilities for replacing the old rules in this area, and explores the concept of "Diminished
Responsibility." Professor Glanville Williams' essay probes into "automatism" and its treatment. Professor Morris Ploscowe concludes this portion
with a most interesting discussion of the treatment of drug addiction and
raises questions concerning the adequacy of the treatment of addicts in this
country.
In the latter portion dealing with "Law Reform Abroad," the French,
German, Soviet and Japanese experiences are considered. Here, also, new
ideas are set forth and significant questions posed. Justice Marc Ancel of
the Cour de Cassation discusses the need for reform of French Codes
founded upon earlier criminological theory inconsistent with modern thought
and reality, as well as some of the problems and issues encountered in law
reform. Professor Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, in dealing with German law
reform, raises the serious question of "whether this age . . . can mobilize
adequate scholarly and political strength to carry this law reform to fruition."
George Ginsburgs and George Mason discuss the Soviet law reform and
the dilemma faced by Soviet leaders relating to the ensurance of "maximum
local effectiveness which would take into consideration the economic, customary, cultural, geographical and historical vagaries inevitably proliferating
over the length and breadth of one-sixth of the earth's surface," while at
the same time "reconciling it with the need for sufficient centralized direction
to counteract local deviations . . . and other numerous manifestations of
potentially dangerous centrifugal forces."
Professor Shigemitsu Dando's essay on the new Japanese Criminal
Procedure Code brings to light an experiment in comparative law. As the
last essay in this world-wide quest for ideas, it appropriately leaves in the
mind of the reader this question: cannot criminal law reform in various
countries benefit from the experience of both the common and civil law?
All in all, Professor Mueller and the Comparative Criminal Law Project
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of the New York University School of Law are to be congratulated on a
job well done. While there are a few things that the reviewer might have
preferred, such as a foreword to each main section which would place the
respective essays in an overall substantive setting and the use of a few
more explanatory footnotes in one or two of the essays, these are matters of
personal preference and not legitimate criticism of the book. Indeed, the
foreword in the front of the book gives a general guide to the nature of essays
to follow and the number of explanatory footnotes is generally sufficient. Nor
is the other feeling of the reviewer-that more ideas and subjects in this
field need exploration-really criticism of the book. Rather, it points to the
need for more books and writings of the nature and quality found here.
In an era when penal codes and statutes are being drafted, and various
criminal theories and procedures are being proposed for future use, thorough
studies must be undertaken. Also, during these times, when freedom and
human rights offer one of the brightest shafts of sunlight in a world darkened
by oppression and despair, it is vitally important-indeed necessary-that
more study be directed toward the formulation of criminal law concepts and
procedures which are in furtherance of the dignity of man.
Because it is a scholarly collection of essays, Professor Mueller's book
has a much greater value than the "light reading" type of book which may
be put back on the shelf to gather dust after a weekend or two of study.
Each essay is so "packed" with ideas that it requires serious thought and
"re-thought." Because of its quality, every law school and college library
should, in the opinion of the reviewer, have at least one copy of this book
on its shelves, and those persons who are genuinely and seriously interested
in criminal law should give it top priority on their personal reading lists.
DONALD

B.

KING*

LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT, by Gerhard
0. W. Mueller, Oceana Publications, Inc., New York, 1961, 160 pages.
Price: $3.50.
For obvious reasons, it is exceedingly difficult for a law-trained writer
to communicate legal thoughts with precision to the layman. Nevertheless,
Professor Mueller, a law teacher at New York University, in his book "Legal
Regulation of Sexual Conduct," undertook such a task. The book-part of
the publisher's Legal Almanac Series-was written, as the author states,
"to acquaint the intelligent non-lawyer with the law's expectations in the
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.S., Washington State

University; LL.B., Harvard University.
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sphere of sexual conduct."' To the mind of this reviewer, the author has
succeeded in making the non-lawyer's acquaintance.
The booklet under review, prepared by Professor Mueller, with the
assistance of Neville Ross, Esq., consists of 63 pages of text and 94 pages
of statutory tables-a detailed and painstaking breakdown of the statutes of
every American jurisdiction for each of the sexual offenses surveyed. While
the main target of the book is the layman, its utility is broader. Noting
that there was "not a single reliable guide to the American statutory law
of sexual offenses," the author sought to supply his "colleagues in law"
with such a "guide through the labyrinth."' 2 Further, it was observed, the
book may be useful to "the various state reform committees" and to "the
multitude of students of law, sociology and related sciences." 3
Noting that many sexual offenses were to be discussed, and that "the
mode of perpetration" is the safest criterion by which such offenses can be
distinguished, the author seized upon the following classification. 4 Under
the head "Sexual Offenses Requiring Heterosexual Connexion," 5 he discussed: rape, statutory rape, incest, adultery, fornication, lewd cohabitation,
seduction and abduction. In the chapter entitled "Sexual Offenses Requiring Other Than Heterosexual Connexion,"6 he explored sodomy (occasionally
called buggery) which in its broadest sense encompasses "all perverse or
unnatural sexual copulations." '7 Under the topic "Sexual Offenses Without
Connexion,"' 8 he examined: indecent liberties, voyeurism and exhibitionism.
In order to reckon effectively with sexual offenses of a "predominantly commercial nature,"9 the author added two separate chapters dealing with
prostitution' ° and obscenity." Under the head of prostitution, he discussed
the prostitute, the house of prostitution, procurement and pimping. Obscenity,
for convenience of treatment, was broken down into commercial obscenity,
its mass publication, and non-commercial obscenity.
In setting the stage for his examination of the specific offenses, the
author indulged in some "general considerations." Among other things, he
discussed the impact and relevance of mental abnormality;12 the nature of
criminal and non-criminal sanctions;13 the applicability of criminal law
1.

MUELLER,

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
Id. at viii.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 53.
Ibid.
Supra note 1, at 56.
Id.at 13.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 24-28.
Id. at 29-31.
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doctrines such as "attempt" and "accessoryship"'
problems. 15

4

and some evidentiary

It is worthy of note, as Professor Mueller sees it, that the law of sexual
offenses is fighting a losing battle; indeed, it is a battle that it cannot win.
In the main, two reasons are assigned for this position: (1) the "threat of
punishment" is not effective "because most sexual misconduct is carried on
by consenting parties in private"-the usual circumstances are such that
"our detection efficiency" is "extremely low." ' Accordingly, the author
concludes, we are left with "an unenforced-and unenforceable-body of law
on sexual offenses." u" (2) The law of sexual offenses lacks "popular support" in that "a wide gap exists between what our medieval law expects the
18
public to do in the sexual sphere, and the actual practices of the public.
While some psychiatrists, according to the author, feel that "the current
rigid standards of our sex laws create unnecessary guilt feelings," others
feel that a repeal of such laws "would remove the psychological block and
open the floodgates to widespread profligacy."' 19
The keynote of the book under review appears to be this: the criminal
law, "with the traditional means at its command," cannot "enforce the
sexual standard which it endorses" and "we must face the fact."' 20 Professor Mueller put it this way:
The law simply cannot direct itself against all immorality, and the
judgment as to what is moral must be entrusted to the responsible
human being, who must engage in his own soul searching with the
whose principal function is the suphelp of those spiritual agencies
21
port of the moral standard.
This book, dealing with a difficult subject matter, has met the sexual
offense problem squarely. Ought the criminal law attempt to set the moral
standard? While this reviewer grants that the criminal law may not have
the equipment to do so effectively, it is not so ineffective that the effort
should not be made. It is of course open to the reader to reach his own conclusion. This book provides an honest and informative base upon which
an intelligent judgment can be made.
CHARLES

E.

TORCIA*

Id. at 31-37.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 15.
Ibid.
Supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 22-23.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; LL.B., 1954, St. Johns
University School of Law; LL.M., 1961, New York University.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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THE PROUD AMERICAN BOY, by Russell Braddon, St. Martin's
Press, 1961, 280 pages. Price: $4.95.
The eyes of the world are focused in these times on the United States
and the way in which it handles its racial problems. Russell Braddon has
created a mythical, though typical, southern town through which he
dramatizes and comments upon the clash between negro and white as the
negro attempts to attain equality with his white neighbor.
The setting of the story is the small town of Golden Eagle, population
12,203-a town with a reputation for being more liberal than most southern
towns. Luke Robert "Boy" Jackson is a negro child of four. The nickname
"Boy" attached because Luke Robert's father considered him his "all-American boy." His parents are educated people, his father being a financially
secure dentist and his mother, a former schoolteacher. "Boy's" formal name,
Luke, came from his Uncle Luke, but he has been known only as "Boy" ever
since his uncle burned to death in a fire set by the Ku Klux Klan a few
years earlier.
This is "Boy" Jackson, his family and his town. The author meticulously lays the foundation of the story as he scans the next four years of
"Boy's" daily life. He introduces the reader to "Boy's" favorite playmate,
Virginia Sundstram. Virginia is the same age as "Boy," and in their playful and innocent manner they agree that someday they will marry. This
close friendship is greatly disquieting to Virginia's parents. Virginia is
white.
At the age of eight "Boy" is charged with raping Ginny. From this
point, events unfold rapidly. "Boy" is taken to jail. His mother is notified
of the charge against him and is told that she will not be permitted to see
her son until the case is to be heard-three days hence. No lawyer can be
found who will help the Jackson family. The case is heard in a closed juvenile
court with only "Boy," his mother, his grandfather, and the town's chief of
police present. The judge is a farcical, Klan-controlled figure, and the hearing is a mockery. The charge is read and sentence is passed. "Boy" is to be
committed to a negro school "until he should be released as provided by
law." Without such imprisonment the judge declares that "Boy" would
probably "grow up to be an ardent sexual criminal." Thus, without a petition, a summons or a proper hearing, "Boy" Jackson, eight years old, is
committed to reform school for rape.
Enter Robert Hale, a brilliant negro lawyer from the north, a man who
has devoted all of his energies to defending his people from the oppression
of the whites. Mr. Hale is contacted, and he flies to Golden Eagle to appeal
"Boy's" conviction. At this point the reader is given an insight into Hale's
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approach to the problem. The attorney gives the story to the Associated
Press and it is carried to newspapers around the world.
On appeal, Hale first attacks the jurisdiction of the juvenile court by
alleging that the elements of due process of petition, summons, and notice
requisite to a criminal proceeding were not observed in the supposed hearing
which "Boy" had had. However, the jurisdiction of the court is upheld because the proceeding was not a normal criminal hearing, but rather one
for alleged delinquent behavior by a juvenile.
Hale's next step is ethically questionable. He is interested more in
attracting world attention to the social question involved than in gaining
"Boy's" release. Forsaking the legal means available to him, Attorney Hale
attempts to force the white supremacists to buckle under the pressures of
public opinion. In this way Hale feels that a great and widely publicized
victory may be won for the negro race. The release of a single eight-year-old
negro boy is secondary. It is the negro race on trial, and Hale intends to
win if it means sacrificing that one child to the cause. If the white men refuse
to be swayed by the public outcry, "Boy's" freedom will be lost.
Russell Braddon speaks out against this sensationalist representation
of the negro race through the youngster's grandfather, a keen-minded, retired
preacher. Hale's questionable methods are laid bare by the old man as
he recognizes the scheme for what it is, an attempt to exonerate "Boy" in
the "Court of Public Opinion." The clash between Hale and the old preacher
dramatizes the underlying differences between those who seek the end of
discrimination by revolutionary means and those who believe that only
through legal processes can true justice and harmony be attained.
Public opinion, not only in the North, but throughout the world, runs
high. "Boy" is a catching name-making good copy for newspapers. Add
to this the sensational crime of rape, committed, allegedly, by an eight-yearold boy, and the newspapers are handed a highly saleable story. Large and
small papers the world over send reporters to Golden Eagle to report the
drama as it unfolds.
Realizing that the eyes of the world are upon its cause, the Ku Klux Klan
refuses to release "Boy." The thought of "nigras" applying pressure upon
them angers the Klan; and nothing will force them to release this symbol of
negro equality. The governor of the state depends upon the Klan's support
for his security in office and cannot risk its loss by releasing "Boy" even in
the face of pleas by the President of the United States.
The author combines all of these forces into a powerful, driving story
that races to a startling conclusion.
The book takes Mr. Braddon's understanding of the South's racial
problem and projects it upon the international scene. One receives the
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impression that a few of the passages are somewhat incredible and that the
author's pen has given way to his imagination and is not sufficiently guided
by realism and fact. But who is to say that a town such as Golden Eagle
cannot exist, that a southern town of 12,203 persons cannot produce a U.S.
Senator, a Governor and a future Vice-Presidential candidate.
THOMAS

DEMARINO

MY LIFE IN COURT, by Louis Nizer, Doubleday and Company, 1961,
524 pages. Price: $5.95.
Louis Nizer, one of America's most famous trial lawyers, has handled
hundreds of varying cases in many different states, yet in the words of Mr.
Nizer, "the excitement has never been diminished. Indeed it has grown.
The challenge is ever new. The contest is ever intense."
From these words one might well be able to sense the drama of the
courtroom which Louis Nizer so vividly displays in his most recent work.
The author of What To Do With Germany, Thinking On Your Feet, and
Between You and Me, has, in this reviewer's opinion, made two major
accomplishments with his latest book. He first has quite successfully
attained his apparent goal of relating in a most brilliant and exciting fashion
the world of suspense and intrigue one encounters when he devotes his
life to that aspect of the legal profession known as trial work.
As a means of accomplishing this objective, Mr. Nizer has written
concerning six diversified areas of human conduct in which he has tried cases.
Each area is represented by one or more actual cases, some celebrated-as
the libel action of Quentin Reynolds v. Westbrook Pegler and the divorce
case of Billy Rose-while others are less famous but equally interesting and
exciting. It is through a step-by-step analysis of these cases that the author
has managed to captivate the authenticity of his life's work and relate it to
his readers.
Possibly even more important than the above accomplishment, Mr. Nizer
has, whether intentionally or not, permitted the reader to gain a wonderful
insight into the author as an individual, as a trial lawyer, and as an American.
The evident ability of this man, coupled with his unbounded energy and
devotion to his client and the profession leaves little doubt as to the reason
for his amazing success as a trial lawyer.
My Life in Court is not only delightfully interesting, but also quite
practical in that it contains innumerable suggestions and rules concerning
legal problems which most certainly are of great value to one in the legal
profession. Indeed, it is the first time this reviewer, while reading for pleasure,
has felt compelled to underscore many segments of the material for future
reference.
JOHN C. PETTIT

